Apache Pulsar can be deployed with no encryption, authentication, or authorization until an operator enables those controls. A product title can find documentation, proxies, brokers, or management pages. It cannot show which services are active or whether a default configuration survived into production.
On 2026-11-21 at 04:47 CST, title="Apache Pulsar" returned 17 ZoomEye matches. app="Apache Pulsar" returned 0 with the same sub_type=all, page 1, and page size 1 settings. The small title set is a candidate list for ownership checks, not a confirmed count of exposed brokers.
The distinction between the broker and the management console is important. The Apache Pulsar security documentation states that a default installation has no encryption, authentication, or authorization. Operators must configure authentication providers and authorization providers, then grant roles access to tenants, namespaces, and topics.
Retire Pulsar Manager where it is still present
Apache Pulsar Manager is a web console for administering clusters. In 2026, the Pulsar project published CVE-2026-105944 for all released Manager versions from 0.1.0 through 0.4.0, with no fixed release. The advisory describes unauthenticated creation of an administrator account, proxied admin requests that bypass Manager authentication, a requester-controlled proxy destination that can carry the configured Pulsar credential, and full administrative privileges for every Manager account in later versions.
The project marked Manager end of life and recommends removing existing deployments and moving to the documented administration UI alternatives. If a deployment cannot be removed immediately, the advisory says not to expose it to untrusted networks and to restrict access to trusted administrators. Replace any configured Pulsar credential or token-signing key that may have been exposed.
A title query for "Apache Pulsar" does not prove that Manager is present. Inventory the specific management URLs, process names, package versions, and proxy routes instead.
Validate broker authorization
Map tenants, namespaces, topics, and the roles allowed to produce or consume. Test a producer with a namespace permission and a second producer without it. Confirm that the second client fails on both the direct broker path and any proxy path.
Review superuser assignments, token issuer trust, TLS listeners, and the network path to broker administration ports. Keep the web management service on an administrative network and separate it from client traffic.
The useful discovery result is a named Pulsar component with a verified version and network path. A generic title count cannot decide whether the broker or a retired console is the exposure.